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Breach of the peace is a cornerstone of public order law in England and Wales
and was considered recently by the Supreme Court in R. (on the application of
Hicks) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis. However, the common
starting-point for discussion of the doctrine is the case of Howell. It is argued
here that this judgment has been misinterpreted to the extent that it requires a
property owner to be present where a breach of peace is founded on harm or the
threat of harm to property. The issue has been placed in stark relief by recent
changes to the nature of protest. Black Bloc protestors eschew physical violence
to persons but pursue a strategy of deliberate property damage. The police may
intervene to prevent a breach of the peace that reasonably appears likely “in the
near future”, but will be unable to intervene if the property owner is not present,
unless harm to persons is anticipated or a criminal offence is “about to” be
committed. This article re-examinesHowell in light of the Black Bloc phenomenon
and contends that, in the absence of legislation, the courts should clarify the law
so that the threat of property damage is sufficient to constitute a breach of the
peace whether or not the owner is present.
Introduction
In the recent case of R. (on the application of Hicks) v Commissioner of Police for
the Metropolis1 the Supreme Court considered whether there had been a breach of
protestors’ rights to liberty and security2 when, in order to prevent a breach of the
peace, the police arrested and detained a number of protestors on the day of the
Royal Wedding. The meaning of breach of the peace was not in issue, but the
Supreme Court approved the judgment in R. (on the application of Laporte) v
Chief Constable of Gloucestershire Constabulary3 and, by necessary implication,
Watkins LJ’s description of breach of the peace in Howell,4 which had been relied
upon as definitive:
1R. (on the application of Hicks) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2017] UKSC 9; [2017] A.C. 256.
2Under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.5 (the
ECHR).
3R. (on the application of Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire Constabulary [2006] UKHL 55; [2007]
2 A.C. 105; [2007] H.R.L.R. 13 (p.316) at [27].
4Howell [1982] Q.B. 416; (1981) 73 Cr. App. R. 31.
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“We are emboldened to say that there is a breach of the peace whenever harm
is actually done or is likely to be done to a person or in his presence to his
property or a person is in fear of being so harmed through an assault, affray,
a riot, unlawful assembly or other disturbance.”5
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s approval of this statement of the law, it is
argued here that there is one part that remains uncertain, namely, whether harm
or the threat of harm to property is sufficient for a breach of the peace, and whether
the property owner must be present. This article re-examines the judgment in
Howell and the “respectable”,6 but largely undeveloped argument that damage to
property is sufficient on its own to constitute a breach of the peace.7
It has frequently been argued that the law on breach of the peace should be
abolished altogether and the appropriate powers provided for in statute instead.8
That may be an attractive proposal, but there seems little or no prospect of it
happening. Over many years, numerous reports, commissions and legislative bills
that proposed reform have all come to nought9 and it is apparent that Parliament
has no appetite for reform. Although proposals for reform made it as far as
publication in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill, they were not enacted
in the 2005 Act of the same title.10 In the light of this, it seems that if reform is to
occur it will be only through the common law.
The doctrine of breach of the peace forms a “cornerstone” of public order law
in England andWales11 and is a central part of “preventive” public order policing.12
It is this, rather than statutory provision, that the police rely upon.13 Indeed, Fenwick
contends that breach of the peace “effectively overshadows all the statutory changes
of the last 30 years”.14 Therefore, this uncertainty in the law is a serious problem,
especially in the light of recent increases in recorded public order offences15 and
criticism of police understanding of the law on breach of the peace.16 However, it
is contended here that it is of particular significance at present because of important
5Howell [1982] Q.B. 416 at 427; Laporte [2006] UKHL 55; [2007] 2 A.C. 105; [2007] H.R.L.R. 13 (p.316) at
[27].
6 J. Beggs, G. Thomas and S. Rickard, Public Order Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012),
p.50.
7For example, this argument is referred to in passing, but not discussed in detail, in A.T.H. Smith, “LawCommission
Working Paper No. 82 – Offences Against Public Order” [1982] Crim L.R. 483, 494 and J. Beggs, G. Thomas and
S. Rickard, Public Order Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.50.
8R. Stone, “Breach of the Peace: the case for Abolition” (2001) 2 Web. J.C.L.I. 3, http://www.bailii.org/uk/other
/journals/WebJCLI/2001/issue2/index.html [Accessed 17 August 2017].
9E.g. the “Philips Report”, The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure Report (1981), Cm.8092 (London: HM
Stationery Office); the Law Commission report, Offences Relating to Public Order No.123, HC 85 (HMSO, 1983);
the HomeOffice Green Paper,Policing:Modernising Police Powers toMeet Community Needs (2004),www.statewatch
.org/news/2004/aug/police-powers-consult.pdf [Accessed 17 August 2017].
10Clause 101(4) abolished the common law power to arrest for a breach of the peace.
11A.T.H. Smith, Offences Against Public Order (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1987), p.181.
12College of Policing, Public order: core principles and legislation, https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content
/public-order/core-principles-and-legislation/ [Accessed 17 August 2017].
13Although in recent years, some forces have also utilised dispersal orders under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime
and Policing Act 2014 s.35
14H. Fenwick, Fenwick on Civil Liberties and Human Rights 5th edn (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), p.554.
15A 39% increase in police recorded offences compared with 2014–15 and following an increase of 28% in the
previous year: Crime in England & Wales: year ending Mar 2017, Office for National Statistics Statistical Bulletin,
20 July 2017, https://www.ons.gov.uk/releases/crimeinenglandandwalesyearendingmarch2017 [Accessed 17 August
2017].
16College of Policing: Three Years On, House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, Fourth Report of Session
2016–17, HC Paper No.23, p.8. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/23/23.pdf;
Adapting to Protest – Nurturing the British Model of Policing (London: Central Office of Information, 25 November
2009), http://www.hmic.gov.uk/media/adapting-to-protest-20090705.pdf [Accessed 17 August 2017].
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changes to the nature of protest. Since around the turn of the millennium, after
decades of the “normalisation” of the confrontation between police and protestors
based on negotiation and dialogue, there has been an upsurge in violent “street
politics”.17 This has involved “transgressive” protestors,18 who have developed
innovative “action repertoires”19 that set them apart from protestors from established
social movements. These protestors have a greater willingness, in particular, to
engage in property damage as a deliberate act of protest.20
The most prominent representatives of this phenomenon are those protestors
who, dressed completely in black and often wearing masks, are called “the Black
Bloc”. They have become a small, if highly visible presence at protests in the UK21
and across the Western World, most recently at the G20 Summit in Hamburg.22
The Black Bloc’s protest strategy of property damage presents a particular problem
for the police who rely on their breach of the peace powers. The police have the
power to intervene to prevent a breach of the peace by arrest or intervention short
of arrest23 where it reasonably appears there is the likelihood of harm to persons
or property “in the near future”.24 However, in relation to property damage, the
further requirement that the owner is present is problematic. As we shall see,
although it is difficult to generalise about the Black Bloc, most activists do not
regard property damage as violence and insist that they are non-violent. Therefore,
they may arrive at a protest with the express purpose of damaging corporate
property in order to convey a political message, but to be otherwise non-violent.25
However, as it is unlikely that the property owner will be present, the police will
be unable to rely on their breach of the peace powers to take preventive action or
arrest, unless either they anticipate harm to persons in the near future or, have
reasonable grounds to suspect that criminal offences are “about to” be committed.26
It is argued here that this is an important flaw in the preventive doctrine of
breach of the peace, but also a significant misinterpretation of the judgment in
Howell27which, accordingly, is discussed in some detail. However, before so doing,
it is necessary, first, to establish the nature of the Black Bloc phenomenon that has
highlighted this problem in the law.
17Della Porta, Peterson and Reiter, “Policing Transnational Protest: An Introduction” in Della Porta, Peterson and
Reiter (eds), The Policing of Transnational Protest (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p.4.
18Tilly categorises protestors as “transgressive” if they employ innovative tactics and are uncooperative with the
police: C. Tilly, “Spaces of Contention” (2000) Mobilization: An International Journal 5(2) 135, 138.
19Tilly’s concept of “repertoires of contention” highlights that social movements have a range of forms of protest
action in a given historical period: C. Tilly, “Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834” in M. Traugott
(ed.), Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action (Durham, NC, 1995), p.26.
20 J. Noakes and P.F. Gillham, “Aspects of the “New Penology” in the Police Response to Major Political Protests
in the United States, 1999-2000” in Della Porta, Peterson and Reiter (eds), The Policing of Transnational Protest
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2006), p.105.
21E.g. R. Ramgobin, “Student protest: demonstrators dispute the actions of Black Bloc anarchists after violence
erupts”, Independent, 5 November 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/student-protest-demonstrators
-dispute-the-actions-of-black-bloc-anarchists-after-violence-erupts-a6722036.html [Accessed 17 August 2017].
22 J. Huggler, Anti-capitalist protestors with homemade weapons converge on Hamburg ahead of G20 summit,
The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/04/anti-capitalist-protestors-homemade-weapons-converge
-hamburg/ [Accessed 17 August 2017].
23The test is the same, Laporte [2006] UKHL 55; [2007] 2 A.C. 105; [2007] H.R.L.R. 13 (p.316) at [29].
24A breach of the peace does not have to be “imminent” in the sense of being “about to” be or on the verge of
happening before the police may intervene. After a period of uncertainty, Lord Rodger’s opinion in Laporte [2006]
UKHL 55; [2007] 2 A.C. 105; [2007] H.R.L.R. 13 (p.316) is now definitive on this issue: Hicks [2017] UKSC 9;
[2017] A.C. 256 at [4].
25R. Amster, Anarchism Today (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2012), p.31.
26 In accordance with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s.24.
27Howell [1982] Q.B. 416; (1981) 73 Cr. App. R. 31.
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What is the Black Bloc?
The origins of the term “Black Bloc” lie in Germany, as it is believed to have been
coined by the West Berlin police to refer to black-clad squatters who took to the
streets to resist evictions in December 1980.28 These activists were part of the
broadly Marxist Autonomous Social Movement,29 but Black Bloc activists are
now, in general, located within the anarchist movement.30 Indeed, it is no
coincidence that the post-millennium upsurge in street activism coincided with a
period described as the “third phase” of expansion for anarchism.31 The “Black
Bloc” is frequently discussed in the singular, but it is important to note that it is
not one group or organisation with defined membership. Nor is it a global
organisation, even if it can be observed at protests in a range of countries. Rather,
it is:
“… a collection of anarchists and anarchist affinity groups32 that get together
for a particular protest action. The flavour of the black bloc changes from
action to action, but the main goals are to provide solidarity in the face of a
repressive police state and to convey an anarchist critique of whatever is being
protested that day.”33
That is, “there is no such thing as the Black Bloc; there are, rather, Black Blocs”34
that arise at demonstrations but dissolve afterwards and take different forms in
different circumstances.
Therefore, it has been argued that the Black Bloc should not be regarded as a
“group” at all, but, rather, as a protest tactic or a way of behaving in street protests.35
Accordingly, the Black Blocmay be described as “an approach to action” at protests
that stresses “group unity, mobility and confrontation”.36 The form of that
“confrontation” can vary, but primarily takes the form of violence to property and,
in particular, the premises of banks and multi-national companies.37
28 F. Dupuis-Déri, “The black blocs ten years after Seattle” (2010) 4(2) Journal for the Study of Radicalism 45,
51.
29E. Yuen, “Introduction” in E. Yuen et al. (ed.), The Battle of Seattle: The New Challenge to Capitalist
Globalization, (New York: Soft Skull Press, 2001), p.11. See generally: G. Katsiaficas, The Subversion of Politics:
European Autonomous Social Movements and the Decolonization of Everyday Life (Oakland CA: AK Press, 2006).
30 F. Dupuis-Déri, “The black blocs ten years after Seattle” (2010) 4(2) Journal for the Study of Radicalism 45,
46.
31The first “classical phase” emerged in the mid-nineteenth century and there was a “mid-level” period in the
1960s and 1970s: J. Pedro Zúquete, “World War A: contemporary anarchists and extreme left perpetrators” in M.
Fredholm (ed.), Understanding Lone Actor Terrorism (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), p.46.
32These may be defined as a small, autonomous unit of activists who are bonded together by mutual trust, friendship
and a shared sense about the kinds of action they wish to take, F. Dupuis-Déri, “Anarchism and the Politics of Affinity
groups” (2010) 18(1) Anarchist Studies 40, 40.
33 Infoshop.org, “Black Blocs for Dummies” webpage, D. Graeber, Direct Action: an Ethnography (Oakland CA:
AK Press, 2009), p.406. See also http://la.indymedia.org/news/2000/08/2397.html [Accessed 17 August 2017].
34 F. Dupuis-Déri, “The black blocs ten years after Seattle” (2010) 4(2) Journal for the Study of Radicalism 45,
46.
35Dupuis-Deri,Who’s afraid of the Black Blocs? (2014), p.3.
36Amster, Anarchism Today (2012), p.30.
37 S. Sullivan, “We are heartbroken and furious!” Engaging with violence in the (anti-)globalisation movement(s)
CSGR Working Paper No.123/03, p.30, http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1981/ [Accessed 17 August 2017].
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The Black Bloc strategy of property damage
The Black Bloc are often dismissed as criminals38 who aim, not to protest, but to
engage in “mindless violence”.39 However, it is clear that, contrary to Theresa
May’s assertions when she was Home Secretary, the Black Blocs’ actions are not
simply the random behaviour of thugs attacking any property in the vicinity.40
Rather, their actions are a form of contentious politics where violence is utilised
as a matter of strategic choice and not accident.41 This is consciously targeted
symbolic violence,42 although Juris argues that Black Bloc actions are better
described as performative violence that is meant to:
“… characterise symbolic ritual enactments of violent interaction with a
predominant emphasis on communication and cultural expression. This is in
contrast to “direct political violence” meant to cause death or injury to other
human beings.”43
That is, the violent actions undertaken by Black Blocs are “thought out and
rationalised”44 and intended to convey a radical critique of the economic and
political system through property damage rather than physical harm to persons.
This may take the form of a critique of the environmental record or working
practices of a particular multi-national business,45 or a more general anti-capitalist
message, which serves to “disentangle the dehumanising conflation of property
and people” or “dismantle the hierarchy of commodification by which law and
property stand above people and places”.46 The well-known ACME Collective
“N30 Black Bloc Communique” puts it more succinctly:
“When we smash a window, we aim to destroy the thin veneer of legitimacy
that surrounds private property rights.”47
The Communique was also clear that the Black Bloc had no interest in fighting
with the authorities.48 Accordingly, a Black Bloc will typically arrive at a protest
38Commander B. Broadhurst quoted in J. Brown, Independent, 27 March 2011, “Recriminations fly after anti-cuts
protests descend into violence”, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/recriminations-fly-after-anti-cuts
-protests-descend-into-violence-2254755.html [Accessed 17 August 2017].
39 P. Oltermann, “Hamburg counts the cost of two nights of violence, looting and destruction”, The Observer, 9
July 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/08/hamburg-counts-cost-two-nights-of-violence-looting
-destruction [Accessed 17 August 2017].
40A. Travis, “Cuts protest: TheresaMay to review police powers in aftermath of clashes”, The Guardian, 28March
2011.
41 J. Goodwin, “Introduction to a special issue on political violence and terrorism: political violence as contentious
politics” (2012) 17(1) Mobilization: An International Journal 1.
42 Sullivan, “We are heartbroken and furious!” Engaging with violence in the (anti-)globalisation movement(s)
CSGR Working Paper No.123, p.13.The violence is symbolic in the sense that it is intended to convey a certain
meaning rather than in Bourdieu’s technical sense of “symbolic violence”,Male Domination (Cambridge: Polity,
2001), pp.1–2.
43 J.S. Juris, Networking Futures: the Movements Against Corporate Globalization (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2008), pp.166 and 181.
44 J. Pedro Zúquete, “World War A: contemporary anarchists and extreme left perpetrators” in M. Fredholm, (ed.)
Understanding Lone Actor Terrorism (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), p.52.
45E.g. the alleged use of sweatshop labour by Gap and destruction of the tropical rainforest by McDonald’s, which
have been attacked regularly and were listed as targets in the ACME Collective’s “N30 Black Bloc Communique”
produced in E. Yuen et al. (eds), The Battle of Seattle: The New Challenge to Capitalist Globalization (New York:
Soft Skull Press, 2001), pp.115–119.
46 J. Ferrell, Tearing Down the Streets: Adventures in Urban Anarchy (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p.234.
47Reproduced in Yuen et al. (eds), The Battle of Seattle: The New Challenge to Capitalist Globalization (2001),
p.118.
48Reproduced in Yuen et al. (eds), The Battle of Seattle: The New Challenge to Capitalist Globalization (2001),
p.117.
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intending to convey a particular message through engaging in “vandalism and
property destruction without wishing to harm human beings”.49 The academic
literature on the Black Bloc is very clear that despite reports of their violent
character “…most Black Bloc participants do not regard themselves as violent by
any means” and are unwilling to use physical force against others.50 Indeed, the
anthropologist, Graeber, describes it as “amusing” that Black Blocs are described
as violent because this contradicts his experience with them “in the field”, during
which he found activists to be so committed to non-violence that they “carefully
avoided stepping on worms” and debated “whether it’s really justifiable to kill a
mosquito”.51
Black Blocs sometimes engage in purely peaceful marches but there have also
been occasions when they have gone beyond property damage and been physically
violent towards persons. There are some activists who are not averse to physically
confronting the police in what they regard as “legitimate acts of resistance” against
a violent state.52 However, the weight of academic authority suggests that at least
some of this physical violence is in self-defence, for example, to protect non-violent
demonstrators from police violence,53 or the result of right-wing agent provocateurs
infiltrating Black Blocs and committing random acts of violence in order to justify
repressive policing measures.54 Accordingly, these exceptional cases should not
detract from the fact that the principal protest strategy of a Black Bloc is to cause
property damage as a form of political expression and that they seek to avoid
physical violence against persons.
This hallmark strategy of “non-violent warfare”55 against corporate property
presents a problem for the police relying on breach of the peace rather than statutory
powers to prevent public disorder. Breach of the peace remains the mainstay of
public order policing56 and the common law power for both the police and the
public57 to intervene to prevent a breach of the peace was preserved expressly by
the Criminal Law Act 196758 and unaffected by later codification of the law in the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Accordingly, it is apparent that Parliament
intended to maintain the ability of the police to take steps to prevent a breach of
49 P. Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: a History of Anarchism (London: Harper Collins, 2008), p.699.
50Amster, Anarchism Today (2012), p.31.
51Graeber, Direct Action: an Ethnography (2009), p.224.
52 J.S. Juris, Networking Futures: the Movements Against Corporate Globalization (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2008), p.38.
53Dupuis-Déri, “The black blocs ten years after Seattle” (2010) 4(2) Journal for the Study of Radicalism 45, 47–49.
E.g. at the G20 Summit in Hamburg: P. Oltermann, “G20: Putin denies US election interference in meeting with
Trump, officials say — as it happened”, The Guardian, 7 July 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017
/jul/07/g20-summit-trump-and-putin-to-meet-as-world-leaders-gather-in-hamburg-live-coverage?page=with%3Ablock
-595f9c4be4b042dfbe78ae2a [Accessed 17 August 2017].
54P.Marshall,Demanding the Impossible: a History of Anarchism (London: Harper Collins, 2008), p.699; Graeber,
Direct Action: an Ethnography (2009), p.468; Juris, Networking Futures: the Movements Against Corporate
Globalization (2008), pp.180–183; Dupuis-Deri,Who’s Afraid of the Black Blocs? (2014), p.137; Amster, Anarchism
Today (2012), p.58.
55D. Graeber, “The new anarchists” (January-February 2002) 13 New Left Review 61, 66; see also on “non-violent
warfare”: S. Critchley, Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance (London: Verso, 2012),
pp.123–124.
56D. Mead, The New Law of Peaceful Protest: Rights and Regulation in the Human Rights Act Era (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2010), p.319
57Albert v Lavin [1982] A.C. 546.
58Criminal Law Act 1967 s.2(7). The 1967 Act abolished the categories of felonies and misdemeanours and
converted the common law power for both constables and citizens to arrest for a felony about to happen to a power
only for constables to arrest for an arrestable offence about to happen. This was replicated in s.24 of the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
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the peace without first establishing what criminal offences have been or are being
committed or who is responsible.59 However, where the police do not anticipate
violence to persons, but only the threat of violence to property, the definition of
breach of the peace inHowell60 appears to require the property owner to be present
for there to be a breach of the peace. If the owner is absent, there is no breach of
the peace. Where the owner is absent the police must wait until the point at which
there are reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence is about to be committed,
for example, under the Criminal Damage Act 1971 or Public Order Act 1986,61
before they can use their statutory powers of arrest, which must also be “necessary”
and relate to a specific individual.62
Therefore, where the police have, for example, reliable intelligence that Black
Bloc activists are planning to attend a protest, with the intention to cause criminal
damage to property at some point (but not physical harm to persons), they will be
unable to arrest, for a breach of the peace, activists marching purposefully towards
their chosen targets, unless an owner will be present. If there is evidence of an
agreement to commit criminal damage, there may be grounds for the police to
arrest for conspiracy63 to commit criminal damage or aggravated trespass.64
However, they will not be trespassers if they do not leave the highway and, although
peaceful protestors may not welcome them, it may not be clear whether they intend
to disrupt, obstruct or intimidate lawful activity. It is possible that an officer may
have reasonable grounds to suspect an agreement by implication, from a person’s
presence in a group known for its strategy of property damage, but these grounds
may be difficult to establish because of the disparate character of Black Blocs.
The latter have a deliberately “decentralised and unpredictable” nature and
characterise themselves as “conductors setting the stage for improvisation” rather
than “military tacticians”.65 Moreover, where such grounds exist, it seems more
likely that they will justify arrests before the demonstration, as occurred when
protestors planning direct action against a power station were arrested before they
could carry out their actions.66
If the police neglect to deal with the threat of property damage that appears
likely in the near future, there is also the risk of more widespread public disorder.
Theremay sometimes be a fine line between the Black Bloc’s performative violence
and physical violence to persons, and there is the danger and that the former will
give rise to the latter as violence escalates,67 in particular, where there is a “critical
mass” of people.68 For example, members of the Black Bloc have reported that
crowds can be “won over” at protests to support other violent actions by criminal
damage to unpopular targets, such as banks and multi-national shops/restaurants.69
59Beggs, Thomas and Rickard, Public Order Law and Practice (2012), p.50.
60Howell [1982] Q.B. 416; (1981) 73 Cr. App. R. 31.
61 Property damage suffices for riot and violent disorder (ss.1 and 2), but other elements may not be satisfied.
62M. Zander, Zander on PACE, 7th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), paras 3.09–3.19.
63Under the Criminal Law Act 1977 s.1.
64Under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s.68.
65Crimethinc Collective, Blocs: Black andOtherwise: https://crimethinc.com/2003/11/20/blocs-black-and-otherwise
[Accessed 25 September 2017].
66 J. Jowitt and M. Taylor, “Police arrest 114 people in pre-emptive strike against environmental protestors”,
Guardian 13April 2009 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/apr/13/nottingham-police-raid-environmental
-campaigners [Accessed 25 September 2017].
67 Juris, Networking Futures: the Movements Against Corporate Globalization (2008), p.167.
68 I am grateful to P.A.J. Waddington for this observation.
69Dupuis-Deri,Who’s Afraid of the Black Blocs? (2014), p.66.
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There may also be human rights implications of police actions. Full discussion
of these is beyond the scope of this article, but the Supreme Court and House of
Lords70 have considered the effect on rights to liberty and protest, under arts 5 and
10–1171 of the European Convention of Human Rights. As these rights are not
“absolute”,72 the key issue will often be whether the restriction on human rights
was proportionate, although the rights of Black Bloc activists are limited to the
extent that they intend committing offences of criminal damage, as there is no
protection for protestors with violent intentions.73 However, a human rights issue
that is pertinent here is that the rights of “non-Black Bloc” protestors may be
interfered with if the police do not intervene to prevent property damage caused
by Black Blocs. It is a common complaint by peaceful protestors that
demonstrations are “hijacked” by Black Blocs and, therefore, the message that
they intended to convey is undermined or lost as a result of the violence that
ensues.74 There is an important difference in “manner and form” between a peaceful
and a violent protest75 and it is evident that, although issues of proportionality will
arise, the right to protest may be infringed where the police neglect their positive
obligation to intervene against Black Blocs in order to facilitate a peaceful protest.76
The European Court of Human Rights has held that, in view of the difficulties
in policing modern societies, the right to protest should not be interpreted so as to
impose an impossible or disproportionate burden upon the police.77 Nevertheless,
protestors do not lose their right to protest where violent protestors join an otherwise
peaceful demonstration78 and the police continue to have a positive obligation to
intervene to protect these rights. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary has
stated that reliable police intelligence will be key in that respect.79 However, even
where this provides good grounds on which to intervene early to protect these
rights, the ability of the police to act will be inhibited by the way that breach of
the peace has been interpreted. Accordingly, it is now necessary to examine the
common law doctrine and the uncertainty that has resulted from the way that the
judgment in Howell80 has been interpreted.
70Hicks [2017] UKSC 9; [2017] A.C. 256; Laporte [2006] UKHL 55; [2007] 2 A.C. 105; [2007] H.R.L.R. 13
(p.316); Austin v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKHL 5; [2009] 1 A.C. 564; [2009] H.R.L.R. 16
(p.412).
71These are often closely associated—art.10 is the lex generalis and art.11 a lex specialis: Ezelin v France (1992)
14 E.H.R.R. 362 (p.362) at [37]; Laporte [2006] UKHL 55; [2007] 2 A.C. 105; [2007] H.R.L.R. 13 (p.316) at [36]
and [85].
72That is, incapable of restriction or exceptions, e.g. the art.3 prohibition on torture.
73Kudrevičius v Lithuania (2016) 62 E.H.R.R. 34 (p.1107) at [92]; Stankov v Bulgaria App. No.29225/95, 2
October 2001 at [77].
74E.g. The Trades Union Congress had intended their protest march on 26 March 2011 to be “family friendly” but
after Black Blocs infiltrated the march, attacking banks and shops, the General Secretary feared that the message of
the march had been “clouded by what else had happened”: Chittenden, Henry and Kinchen, “Anarchist Thugs mar
union march”, Sunday Times, 27 March 2011.
75R. (on the application of Gallestegui) v Westminster City Council [2013] EWCA Civ 28; [2013] 1 W.L.R. 2377;
[2013] H.R.L.R. 15 (p.283); R. (on the application of Barda) v Mayor of London [2015] EWHC 3584 (Admin);
[2016] 4 W.L.R. 20;Maguire v United Kingdom (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. SE12 (p.333) at [45].
76Plattform Ärtze für das Leben v Austria (1988) 13 E.H.R.R. 204 at [32] and [34]; Djavit An v Turkey (2005) 40
E.H.R.R. 45 at [57].
77Karaahmed v Bulgaria App. No.30587/13, 24 February 2015 at [96]; Austin v United Kingdom (2012) 55
E.H.R.R. 14 (p.359) at [55].
78Christians Against Racism and Fascism (CARAF) v United Kingdom App. No.8440/78, 16 July 1980 at
[147]–[148]; Ezelin v France (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 362 at [34].
79A review of national police units which provide intelligence on criminality associated with protest (HMIC, 2012),
p.6, http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/publications/review-of-national-police-units-which-provide
-intelligence-on-criminality-associated-with-protest-20120202/ [Accessed 17 August 2017].
80Howell [1982] Q.B. 416; (1981) 73 Cr. App. R. 31.
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Howell and the clarification of “breach of the peace”
A lay person could be forgiven for expecting that breach of the peace, a doctrine
that has been at the heart of public order law for many years would be: (a) a criminal
offence; and (b) clearly defined. However, although breach of the peace is a criminal
offence in Scotland,81 it is not in England and Wales.82 In terms of definition, the
expression must also be treated with considerable caution. In the first place, one
should take care not to confuse it with a police constable’s historic and primary
duty to preserve the Queen’s peace by preventing the commission of criminal
offences and protecting property, as this is a duty of more general nature.83 In the
second place, the doctrine should not be “taken at face value”, as GlanvilleWilliams
aptly commented: “The expression ‘breach of the peace’ seems clearer than it is”.84
Supperstone contends that common-sense lies at the roots of breach of the
peace.85Accordingly, as “peace” is an ordinary English word, one might anticipate
that, in common-sense terms, it would mean quietness or an “absence of noise.”86
It would then follow that a “breach of the peace” would be a breach of this
condition. Indeed, it is apparent that at one time it was thought that any public
disturbance constituted a breach of the peace and that the additional presence of
violence was only significant because it provided a power of arrest.87 However,
there is also authority that something more than a mere disturbance to the
equilibrium of the normal state of society88 is required for a breach of the peace.
“Mere agitation,”89 noise,90 disturbance of a public meeting by annoying the
speaker,91 disorderliness (such as swearing)92 or quarrelling93 have all been held to
be insufficient.
The law was clarified in Howell94 to the extent that it is now “beyond doubt”95
that the essence of a breach of the peace is violence or the threat of violence.96
Accordingly, not every disturbance is a breach of the peace. It is also commonly
considered that Watkins LJ went further than just clarifying the essence of breach
81 Smith v Donnelly 2001 S.L.T. 1007; 2001 S.C.C.R. 800.
82Williamson v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [2003] EWCA Civ 337; [2004] 1 W.L.R. 14 at 19. Even
if it is treated as such for the purposes of the European Convention on Human Rights: Steel v United Kingdom (1999)
28 E.H.R.R. 603.
83Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2; [2015] A.C. 1732; [2015] H.R.L.R. 8 (p.295)
at [29]–[35]; Glasbrook Bros Ltd v Glamorgan CC [1925] A.C. 270 at 277; G. Williams, “Preventive Justice and the
Rule of Law” (1953) 16(4) M.L.R. 417, 418. See also Halsbury’s Laws of England, 5th edn (2013), Vol.84, para.40
and the revised attestation made by constables provided for by Police Reform Act 2002 s.83.
84G. Williams, “Arrest for Breach of the Peace” [1954] Crim. L.R. 578, 578.
85M. Supperstone, Brownlie’s Law of Public Order and National Security (London: Butterworths, 1981), p.1.
86D. Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002),
p.1018.
87As noted in Austin v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2005] EWHC 480 (QB); [2005] H.R.L.R. 20
(p.647) at [121].
88As was stated, for many years, in the police officer’s handbookMoriarty’s Police Law, e.g. W.J. Williams,
Moriarty’s Police Law, 17th edn (London: Butterworths, 1963), p.218.
89 Jarrett v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [2003] EWCA Civ 397; [2003] Po. L.R. 87 at [23].
90Redmond-Bate v DPP [2000] H.R.L.R. 249 at 255; Grant v Moser (1843) 5 Man. & G. 123 at 130.
91Wooding v Oxley (1839) 9 Car. & P. 1 at 5.
92 Lockley (1864) 4 F. & F. 155 at 159.
93 Jordan v Gibbon (1863) 3 F. & F. 607 at 613.
94Howell [1982] Q.B. 416; (1981) 73 Cr. App. R. 31.
95Percy v DPP [1995] 3 All E.R. 124 at 131. Or, at least, it is “sufficiently established”: Steel (1999) 28 E.H.R.R.
603 at [55].
96Laporte [2006] UKHL 55; [2007] 2 A.C. 105; [2007] H.R.L.R. 13 (p.316) at [27]. This contrasts with Glanville
Williams’s view that the essence of breach of the peace is “some danger to the person”: “Arrest for Breach of the
Peace” [1954] Crim. L.R. 578, 579.
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of the peace and that the description of the doctrine referred to earlier97 amounts
to a full definition.98
Watkins LJ observed that a “comprehensive definition of the term “breach of
the peace” has very rarely been formulated”99 but it is not clear that his Lordship
intended to do more than provide examples of conduct that would constitute a
breach of the peace. Watkins LJ was not alone in regarding breach of the peace
as an elastic concept that was not amenable to exact definition. Shortly after the
judgment inHowell, the LawCommission observed that the concept was susceptible
to broad interpretation100 and the Government made it clear in its White Paper,
published prior to the Public Order Act 1986, that it “saw advantage in the
flexibility of the common law powers” and was, therefore, content not to define
breach of the peace in legislation.101
The judgment inHowell has been accepted generally as authoritative, but it has
also been subject to the criticism that it lacks certainty in two respects.102 First, it
has been claimed that there is a second definition that conflicts with the one cited
earlier (“the first definition”)103 and, secondly, that Howell conflicts with Lord
Denning’s judgment, just over six months later, in Chief Constable of Devon and
Cornwall Constabulary Ex p. Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB).104
However, both these criticisms appear misplaced.
As it does not appear to have been Watkins LJ’s purpose to provide a definition
of breach of the peace, the first criticism of Howell as containing contradictory
definitions falls away. However, even if it is accepted that it was his Lordship’s
purpose and the following is a further definition,105 it is arguable that, rather than
conflicting, it is in very similar terms:
“Nevertheless, even in these days when affrays, riotous behaviour and other
disturbances happen all too frequently…we cannot accept that there can be
a breach of the peace unless there has been an act done or threatened to be
done which either actually harms a person, or in his presence his property,
or is likely to cause such harm, or which puts someone in fear of such harm
being done.”106
The conflict is said to arise because the “first definition” may be regarded as
limiting the types of violent conduct that will constitute a breach of the peace to
the common law offences listed—assault, affray, etc., whereas the “second
97 See above fn.5 and accompanying text.
98 Laporte [2006] UKHL 55; [2007] 2 A.C. 105; [2007] H.R.L.R. 13 (p.316) at [27] but also in earlier authority,
e.g. Foulkes v Chief Constable of Merseyside [1998] 3 All E.R. 705 at 710; Jarrett [2003] EWCA Civ 397; [2003]
Po. L.R. 87 at [22] and DPP v Orum [1989] 1 W.L.R. 88 at 94.
99Howell [1982] Q.B. 416 at 426.
100Law Commission, Criminal Law: Offences Relating to Public Order No.123 (1983), HC Paper No.85, paras
5.14 and 5.44.
101Review of Public Order Law Report (1985), Cm.9510, para.6.13.
102K. Reid and D. Nicolson, “Arrest for breach of the peace and the European Convention on Human Rights”
[1996] Crim. L.R. 764, 767.
103 See above fn.5 and accompanying text.
104Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall Constabulary Ex p. Central Electricity Generating Board [1982] Q.B.
458.
105Accepted as authoritative in a number of cases, e.g. Hawkes v DPP [2005] EWHC 3046 (Admin) at [11]; G v
Chief Superintendent of Stroud Police (1988) 86 Cr. App. R. 92 at 95.
106Howell [1982] Q.B. 416 at 426.
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definition” does not contain these limitations.107 However, the opening phrase in
the “second definition” (here italised for emphasis) is usually omitted. The conflict
vanishes when it is included, as it becomes apparent that this is virtually the same
list of offences listed at the end of the “first definition”. Neither statement appears
to have been intended as a limit on the type of violence but, rather, as examples
of the violent conduct that would suffice for a breach of the peace.108
In relation to the CEGB case, it has been argued that Lord Denning’s statement
of the law was “radically different”,109 as his Lordship appeared to hold that the
threat of violence was not a pre-requisite for a breach of the peace and it was
sufficient if a person was unlawfully and physically prevented from carrying out
his work.110 This analysis has been doubted111 but, in any event, if Watkins LJ’s
judgment is interpreted as providing only a partial definition or description of
breach of the peace, any such differences fromHowell appear much less significant.
If Howell is reliable authority for the proposition that breach of the peace is
concerned with the prevention of violence or the threat of violence, it still remains
to be considered whether the “violence” that Watkins LJ placed at the centre of
the doctrine includes harm to property, and whether that is property simpliciter or
whether the presence of an owner is required.
“Harm… to a person or in his presence to his property”
In his classic article on the subject, Glanville Williams doubted that a threat to
property was sufficient violence for a breach of the peace.112However, he conceded
that it might be possible where the threat was to a dwelling-house rather than
personal property.113 More recently, Feldman, concurring with that view, found
that the effect of Howell was to limit property damage to a person’s “messuage in
his presence”.114 However, as Williams acknowledged in his later work,115 this
interpretation of Howell is unduly narrow because at no point in Watkins LJ’s
judgment is there an indication that his Lordship meant to restrict the term
“property” to a “dwelling-house”.116 “Property” is, of course, a well-recognised
civil law concept that applies beyond dwellings to anything that is capable of being
the subject of ownership.117 Indeed, the Public Order Act 1986, which to some
107Reid and Nicolson, “Arrest for breach of the peace and the European Convention on Human Rights” [1996]
Crim. L.R. 764, 767. See also: R. Card, Public Order Law (Bristol: Jordans, 2000), para.2.4.
108 It is evident that a narrow interpretation of the violence required was not adopted in Laporte [2006] UKHL 55;
[2007] 2 A.C. 105; [2007] H.R.L.R. 13 (p.316) at [27]. The reference to “other disturbance” also appears consistent
with this interpretation: Card, Public Order Law (Jordans, 2000), para.2.4.
109H. Fenwick, “Marginalising human rights: breach of the peace, kettling, the Human Rights Act 1998 and public
protest” [2009] P.L. 737, 753. And contrary to the opinions of Lawton LJ and Templeman LJ, Chief Constable of
Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, Ex p. Central Electricity Generating Board [1982] Q.B. 458, 476 and 479.
110 “There is a breach of the peace whenever a person who is lawfully carrying out his work is unlawfully and
physically prevented by another from doing it”, Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, Ex p. Central
Electricity Generating Board [1982] Q.B. 458 at 471.
111 Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (2002), p.1019.
112G. Williams, “Arrest for Breach of the Peace” [1954] Crim. L.R. 578.
113As in Ingle v Bell (1836) 1 M. &W. 516; G. Williams, “Arrest for Breach of the Peace” [1954] Crim. L.R. 578,
579.
114 Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (2002), p.1019.
115G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd edn (London: Stevens & Sons, 1983), p.487.
116When, for example, he refers to “threatened attacks upon a person’s body or property”: Howell [1982] Q.B.
416 at 426.
117A.T.H. Smith,Offences Against Public Order (London: Sweet &Maxwell, 1987), p.56; See alsoMitsui Sumitomo
Insurance Co (Europe) Ltd v Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime [2013] EWHC 2734 (Comm); [2014] 1 All E.R.
422 at [69] and [2016] UKSC 18; [2016] A.C. 1488. The definition contained in s.10 of the Criminal Damage Act
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extent codified the common law in this area,118 defines the term “dwelling” but not
“property”. This tends to suggest that it is not necessary to interpret property in
this restrictive way for breach of the peace.
Moreover, it is also evident fromWatkins LJ’s discussion of the power to arrest
for a breach of the peace in Howell that he did not intend limiting the meaning of
“property” to dwelling-houses or “messuage”. His Lordship referred to a police
constable’s primary duty to “prevent the commission of crime” and “keep the
peace”119 which, of course, includes protecting “property”,120 and continued:
“To deny … the right to arrest a person who he reasonably believes is about
to breach the peace would be to disable him from preventing that which might
cause serious injury to someone or even to many people or to property.”121
The reference here to “property” was unqualified, but in both the two “definitions”
of breach of the peace identified in Howell, Watkins LJ appeared to restrict the
extent to which harm to property may constitute a breach of the peace to
circumstances where the property is “in the presence of its owner”. In addition,
his Lordship stated:
“There is nothing more likely to arouse resentment and anger…and a desire
to take instant revenge, than attacks or threatened attacks upon a person’s
body or property.”122
Accordingly, it has often been considered that the potential for harm to property
is only significant in so far as it leads to harm to persons.123However, it is submitted
that this is a misinterpretation of the judgment. First, Watkins LJ located his
description of breach of the peace squarely within the “evolving process of the
development of… the common law”.124His Lordship was not advocating a radical
departure from tradition. The common law has long provided that the public as
well as the police have an obligation to intervene to prevent a breach of the peace,
even if that is an “imperfect obligation”,125 and there seems no reason to believe
that the community’s obligation is restricted only to protecting property in the
presence of its owner.126
Secondly, as it is not clear that Watkins LJ intended to provide a full definition
of breach of the peace, his comments regarding property should not be read in
isolation and accorded undue significance. For example, as we have seen, his
1971, may also be regarded as reflecting the ordinary meaning of the term: “In this Act “property”means of a tangible
nature, whether real or personal, including money”.
118 Smith, Offences Against Public Order (1987), p.6.
119Howell [1982] Q.B. 416 at 426.
120Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2; [2015] A.C. 1732; [2015] H.R.L.R. 8 (p.295)
at [29]–[35]; Glasbrook [1925] A.C. 270 277; G. Williams, “Preventive Justice and the Rule of Law” (1953) 16(4)
M.L.R. 417, 418. See also Halsbury’s Laws of England, 5th edn (2013), Vol.84, para.40 and the revised attestation
made by constables provided for by Police Reform Act 2002 s.83.
121Howell [1982] Q.B. 416 at 426.
122Howell [1982] Q.B. 416 at 426.
123E.g. Percy v DPP [1995] 3 All E.R. 124 at 131.
124Howell [1982] Q.B. 416 at 427.
125Albert v Lavin [1982] A.C. 546 at 565 per Lord Diplock. See also Sir C.K. Allen, The Queen’s Peace (London:
Stevens & Sons, 1953), p.69.
126Moreover, a common law obligation to protect property and not just persons is evident in the related “liability
of the hundred”, which requires the local community to “share the burden of keeping the peace and of the misfortune
of loss or injury” by standing surety in the event of a riot:Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co (Europe) Ltd v Mayor’s
Office for Policing and Crime [2016] UKSC 18; [2016] A.C. 1488. See also Allen, The Queen’s Peace (1953),
pp.81–84.
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Lordship referred to a breach of the peace where there was the threat of injury to
property without any express reference to “an owner’s presence”.127 Accordingly,
it is contended that the reference to harm to property in an “owner’s presence” and
“the desire to take revenge” were not intended as definitive but, rather, to stand
as examples of violent conduct that would constitute a breach of the peace,
alongside the examples listed at common law of assault, affray, riot and unlawful
assembly.128
“This isn’t violence!”—a broad or a narrow interpretation of
“violence”?
The contention that harm to property, without the need for the presence of an
owner, should be sufficient “violence” to constitute a breach of the peace ought
not to be surprising. This reflects the common usage of this “ordinary English
word”,129 which is defined broadly by the Oxford English Dictionary as the
“deliberate exercise of physical force against a person or property”130 and the
“common sense” roots of breach of the peace referred to by Supperstone.131
However, the meaning of the term is not entirely transparent and at this point it is
worth returning to the Black Bloc, as an important aspect of their actions is that
most activists assert that property destruction does not amount to violence. Some
do acknowledge their actions are violent but contend that they are justified
self-defence132 against “structural violence”133 imposed on people by the state.
However, more activists as Zúquete has observed, “reconceptualise” violence in
order to justify property damage as an essentially “non-violent” activity.134 This
reconceptualising of violence is largely on the grounds that “property feels no
pain”135 or “you can’t be violent to an inanimate object”.136 For these activists an
action is non-violent if it does not involve “any direct physical harm to human
beings”137 and, therefore, they insist that property damage is always non-violent.
For example, armed with hammers and crowbars, Black Bloc protestors were
responsible for much of the property damage that followed President Trump’s
inauguration, which was justified in these simple terms: “Property damage is not
violence…Violence against other people is violence”.138
127 See fn.121 and accompanying text.
128This is consistent with Watkins LJ’s partial reliance on Lord Parker CJ’s description of breach of the peace in
Gelberg v Miller [1961] 1 W.L.R. 153 at 158 as “some affray or violence or possibly disturbance”, which is reflected
in his two “definitions”.
129Nash (t/a Dino Services Ltd) v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd [1989] 1 All E.R. 422 at 426 CA.
130OED Online (Oxford University Press, June 2017).
131M. Supperstone, Brownlie’s Law of Public Order and National Security (London: Butterworths, 1981), p.1.
132 J. Pedro Zúquete, “Hell Yes, We’re Fighting! Revolutionary Anarchism’s Call for Destruction and Creation”
in G. Michael, Extremism in America (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2015), p.58.
133 J. Pedro Zúquete, “World War A: contemporary anarchists and extreme left perpetrators” in M. Fredholm (ed.),
Understanding Lone Actor Terrorism (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), p.49. P. Bourgois defines it as “chronic,
historically-entrenched political-economic oppression and social inequality” in “The power of violence in war and
peace” (2001) 2(1) Ethnography 5, 8. However, the phrase is attributed to J. Galtung, “Violence, peace and peace
research” (1969) 6 Journal of Peace Research 167.
134Zúquete, “WorldWar A: contemporary anarchists and extreme left perpetrators” in Fredholm (ed.),Understanding
Lone Actor Terrorism (2016), p.52.
135Graffiti written on a wall during the World Trade Organisation disturbances in 1999 in Seattle, where the Black
Bloc played a prominent role, Dupuis-Deri,Who’s afraid of the Black Blocs? (2014), p.79.
136Graeber, Direct Action: an Ethnography (2009), p.177.
137Graeber, “The new anarchists” (January-February 2002) 13 New Left Review 61, 66.
138 P. Hermann, K.L. Alexander and M.E. Miller, “Protestors who destroyed property on Inauguration Day were
part of well-organized group”, TheWashington Post, 21 January 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public
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On the face of it, referring to damaging property as non-violent appears to be a
simple misnomer because, as we have seen, the accepted meaning of “violent”
includes both harm to persons and property. However, Baroness Hale stated recently
in a domestic violence case, Yemshaw v Hounslow LBC,139 that “violence” is “not
a term of art”:
“It is capable of bearing several meanings and applying to many different
types of behaviour. These can change and develop over time. There is no
comprehensive definition ….”140
Sociologists have likewise struggled with the concept and, in common with the
Black Bloc, have defined it only in terms of physical violence.141 However, such
limited definitions have also been met with criticism within the discipline. As
Jackman has observed, to define violence without reference to property does not
“encapsulate…the full assortment of injuries that humans find consequential”,
which include “material outcomes such as the destruction, confiscation, or
defacement of property”.142 Indeed, the omission of property damage from a
definition of violence seems particularly surprising because, as Jackman has stated,
for those affected by it, property damage is “routinely acknowledged as some of
the terrible costs of terrorism and war with profound material, psychological, and
social repercussions”.143 However, whatever the position taken by the Black Bloc
or within the discipline of sociology, we must return to how “violence” has been
interpreted in law.
The reference to the “presence of the owner” in Howell has been commonly
interpreted as meaning that property damage is not sufficient violence on its own
for a breach of the peace. However, the decision of the European Court of Human
Rights in Steel v United Kingdom144 is a notable exception. The judgment has been
criticised for “failing to accurately distill” the law contained in Howell145 but, it
appears that, on the contrary, the Strasbourg Court provided a cogent analysis of
the law that captured accurately its common law flexibility—that of a “description”
or a partial definition of breach of the peace. Thus, the Court observed that the
concept of breach of the peace had been clarified to such an extent that it was
“sufficiently” established that a breach of the peace would be committed:
“Only when an individual causes harm, or appears likely to cause harm, to
property or acts in a manner the natural consequence of which would be to
provoke others to violence.”146
It is also evident from this that the Strasbourg Court did not confine harm to
property to circumstances where the owner is present and it is submitted that, rather
than an oversight or misunderstanding, this was the result of insight into the nature
-safety/protesters-who-destroyed-property-on-inauguration-day-part-of-well-organized-group/2017/01/21/096678c8
-dfeb-11e6-ad42-f3375f271c9c_story.html?utm_term=.70dc44bad26a [Accessed 17 August 2017].
139 Yemshaw v Hounslow LBC [2011] UKSC 3; [2011] 1 W.L.R. 433; [2011] H.L.R. 16 (p.251).
140 Yemshaw [2011] UKSC 3; [2011] 1 W.L.R. 433; [2011] H.L.R. 16 (p.251) at [27].
141 See the discussion in M. Jackman, “Violence in social life” (2002) 28 Annual Review of Sociology 347, 388.
142 Jackman, “Violence in social life” (2002) 28 Annual Review of Sociology 347, 393.
143 Jackman, “Violence in social life” (2002) 28 Annual Review of Sociology 347, 395.
144 Steel v United Kingdom (1999) 28 E.H.R.R. 603.
145Mead, The New Law of Peaceful Protest: Rights and Regulation in the Human Rights Act Era (2010), p.360.
146 Steel v United Kingdom (1999) 28 E.H.R.R. 603 at [27] and [55].
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of the law on breach of the peace.147 That is, the Court interpreted “violence”
broadly, so that it included harm to persons but also to property, without further
qualification.
When the Law Commission reviewed public order law in the Criminal Law:
Offences Relating to Public Order (No.123) report that led to the Public Order Act
1986, it considered whether “breach of the peace” should remain an element in
public order offences.148 The Commission referred to the usual interpretation of
Watkins LJ’s judgment in Howell, but doubted that the presence of an owner was
required for damage to property to amount to violence for the purposes of breach
of the peace,149 and accepted the dictionary definition of the term “violence” as the
primary meaning at common law.150Accordingly, the definition in cl.8(1) of the
Law Commission’s Draft Public Order Bill did not require property to be in the
presence of an owner and the Law Commission even extended the meaning of
violence to conduct that did not actually cause injury or damage:
“‘violence’ means any violent conduct, so that – (a) except in the context of
affray, it includes violent conduct towards property as well as violent conduct
towards persons, and (b) it is not restricted to conduct causing or intended to
cause injury or damage but includes any other violent conduct (for example
throwing at or towards a person a missile of a kind capable of causing injury
which does not hit or falls short).”
The Public Order Act 1986 that followed was a more radical revision of the law
than envisaged by the Law Commission151 but, nevertheless, included many of the
LawCommission’s recommendations. Thus, the definition of “violence” contained
in s.8, which applies to all offences under the 1986 Act except for affray, is in the
same terms as cl.8(1). This also largely reflects the common law position, as both
riot and unlawful assembly could be committed where there was violence to
property and to the person,152 and it would be surprising if the position was different
for a breach of the peace.
A broad interpretation of the term “violence” may also be found more recently
in the common law. In Antonelli v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry,153
Beldam LJ regarded it as self-evident that setting fire to property was “violence”
and that there was no justification for confining the term to “violence to the
person”.154 Likewise, in Yemshaw v Hounslow LBC155 Baroness Hale declined to
accept an interpretation limited to “physical violence”:
147The omission of reference to an owner’s presence does not always appear to have been noticed where Steel has
been cited in caselaw, e.g. in Laporte [2006] UKHL 55; [2007] 2 A.C. 105; [2007] H.R.L.R. 13 (p.316) at [137] in
R. (on the application of Hicks) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2014] EWCA Civ 3 at [40].
148As in the Public Order Act 1936.
149Damage to property “may well be restricted” to these circumstances, but it implied it was not certain: para.5.44.
150Law Commission, Criminal Law: Offences Relating to Public Order No.123 (1983), paras 5.31–5.32.
151 Smith, Offences Against Public Order (1987), p.26.
152 It is also arguable that affray could be committed by damage to property, as the essence of the offence was that
two or more persons were fighting “to the terror of the Queen’s subjects”, which could be caused by property damage:
M. Supperstone, Brownlie’s Law of Public Order and National Security, (London: Butterworths, 1981), pp.121–123
and 140–143.
153Antonelli [1998] Q.B. 948.
154Antonelli [1998] Q.B. 948 at 961.
155 Yemshaw [2011] UKSC 3; [2011] 1 W.L.R. 433; [2011] H.L.R. 16 (p.251).
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“I can readily accept that this is a natural meaning of the word….But I do
not accept that it is the only natural meaning of the word.”156
It is respectfully submitted that this is correct and that “violence” is an ordinary
English word that must be interpreted broadly so as to include harm to property
as well as to the person. That is consistent with the judgment in Steel v United
Kingdom157 but also, perhaps more importantly, reflects its meaning in public order
legislation and how the term was interpreted at common law.
Conclusion
The purpose of this article has been to consider the meaning of breach of the peace
in the light of recent developments in the nature of protest and, in particular, the
Black Bloc phenomenon. Following the approval of the Howell158 judgment in
Laporte159 it has become well-established that the essence of the doctrine of breach
of the peace is violence or the threat of violence, but what has been less clear is
whether violence to property on its own is sufficient for a breach of the peace, and
whether the presence of an owner is required. This law was left untouched by the
Supreme Court’s recent decision inR. (on the application of Hicks) v Commissioner
of Police for the Metropolis160 and, plainly, it is highly unsatisfactory for a doctrine
at the heart of public order law in England and Wales to remain uncertain to this
extent.
In general, Howell161 has been interpreted as providing that only violence to
property in the presence of an owner is sufficient violence. However, it has been
argued here that this is a significant misinterpretation of Watkins LJ’s judgment
inHowell. Moreover, the changes in the nature of protesting since the millennium,
which have seen things “kicking off everywhere”,162 have highlighted the difficulties
this misinterpretation can cause in terms of preserving public order. Black Blocs,
the most prominent example of changes that have occurred in protest, have
developed “a new language of civil disobedience”.163 They do not regard property
damage as violence and their principal protest strategy is to engage in “non-violent
warfare” against corporate property, while “eschewing any direct physical harm”
to persons.164 Therefore, where the police are aware that the Black Bloc intend to
damage corporate property at a protest “in the near future”, but to be otherwise
non-violent, they are presented with a problem if, rather than utilising their statutory
powers, they rely on the common law power to prevent a breach of the peace.
According to the usual interpretation of Howell, they are unable to intervene to
prevent a breach of the peace if the property owner is absent. The police may act
if violence, in the sense of physical harm to persons, is anticipated in the near
future, or if a criminal offence is “about to” be committed, but are otherwise
restricted in their actions.
156 Yemshaw [2011] UKSC 3; [2011] 1 W.L.R. 433; [2011] H.L.R. 16 (p.251) at [19].
157 Steel (1999) 28 E.H.R.R. 603.
158Howell [1982] Q.B. 416.
159 Laporte [2006] UKHL 55; [2007] 2 A.C. 105; [2007] H.R.L.R. 13 (p.316).
160Hicks [2017] UKSC 9; [2017] A.C. 256.
161Howell [1982] Q.B. 416.
162 P. Mason,Why it’s Kicking Off Everywhere (London: Verso, 2012).
163Graeber, “The new anarchists” (January-February 2002) 13 New Left Review 61, 66.
164Graeber, “The new anarchists” (January-February 2002) 13 New Left Review 61, 66.
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In view of the danger of escalating violence at demonstrations and human rights
concerns in relation to other protestors, it is submitted that the power to arrest for
a breach of the peace should not be contingent on the presence of the owner, where
there is the reasonable likelihood of a threat of property damage in the near future.165
It is to be hoped that, in the absence of legislative reform, the courts will review
this uncertain area of the law at the earliest opportunity.
165This is the power to arrest for a breach of the peace at common law: Hicks [2017] UKSC 9; [2017] A.C. 256
at [4]; Laporte [2006] UKHL 55; [2007] 2 A.C. 105; [2007] H.R.L.R. 13 (p.316) at [62].
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